global (and other forms of) rule. If topographical knowledge is so integrally important to capitalists and other agents of domination and to the maintenance of uneven development, its appropriation should be important to countering them.
What I want to offer here is a noninnocent topography of globalization and its entailments in one place as a vehicle for developing a gendered oppositional politics that moves across scale and space. The place in question is in central eastern Sudan, a village that I call Howa, where I have worked, and sometimes lived, since 1980. In producing this topography, I have no intention of offering "the local" as a bulwark against "the global," or as an instance of something more true, real, or differentiated in a rapidly homogenizing world. Homogenization is not the script of globalization so much as differentiation and even fragmentation. In fact, while globalization may be nothing new, what is new, suggests Michel-Rolph Trouillot (1996) , is the greater awareness of global processes among increasingly fragmented populations all over the world. Given the growth and velocity of what he calls "global flows," Trouillot indicates that this awareness of globality is increasing everywhere (1996) . While contemporary globalization may be understood as people, capital, and information moving with greater density, faster and further, it is also through these means that globality comes home and reworks that too. Much like Inderpal Grewal's and Caren Kaplan's (1994) "scattered hegemonies," Trouillot calls this phenomenon "fragmented globality," and he suggests that world histories (and geographies) I Katz and local histories (and geographies) are simultaneously becoming more intertwined and more contradictory (1996) . These contradictions are increasingly ugly. Thus, without romanticizing the local scale or any particular place, I want to get at the specific ways globalization works on particular grounds in order to work out a situated, but at the same time scale-jumping and geography-crossing, political response to it (see Smith 1992) . Tracing the contour lines of such a "countertopography" to other sites might encourage and enable the formation of new political-economic alliances that transcend both place and identity and foster a more effective cultural politics to counter the imperial, patriarchal, and racist integument of globalization.
The particular grounds in question are those of Howa in central eastern Sudan. The village was settled by pastoralists in the late nineteenth century.
According to local residents, Howa was established in the 1870s about twelve years before the period of national rule known as the Mahdiyya, which was brought about in 1885, when the forces of Muhammed Ahmad al-Mahdi overthrew Ottoman rule and was ended by the reconquest in 1898, when British forces led by Kitchener defeated the independent state and established the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. The village was located on the Dinder River, an ephemeral stream that provided year-round access to water, in an area of woodland savannah and clay soils. There was enough rainfall to support the cultivation of sorghum and a few other crops, but animals remained an important part of the village economy and people's everyday lives. People in Howa kept close economic and social ties with their still nomadic kin throughout the twentieth century, sharing family celebrations and extended visits, having livestock graze seasonally with the flocks of their nomadic relatives, and sometimes intermarrying.
From the time of its settlement until the end of the 1960s, Howa was characterized by a largely subsistence economy built upon a mixture of land use practices that included dryland cultivation of the staple food crop, sorghum, sesame grown for cash, animal husbandry, and forestry. Villagers provided for their own subsistence through the cultivation of sorghum and a small number of other crops, the production of milk and other dairy products, and the occasional sharing of an animal for meat. They cut wood for fuel, construction, and furniture from the surrounding savannah forests, and they gathered various fruits, nuts, medicines, and other resources from the woodlands as well. Their relatively minimal needs for cash (for taxes imposed by the colonial government and for selected goods such as tea, coffee, sugar, cloth, and tobacco) were met by selling sesame to merchants who passed through the area at harvest time, the occasional sale of an animal trekked most commonly to El Guesi (Dinder), twenty-five kilometers away, and the sale of surplus sorghum. Of course, some of the local population were more involved in the cash economy early on. Some were petty traders; some were religious Shaykhs receiving tributes from followers and providing amulets, blessings, advice, and the like in exchange for a small fee; some were moneylenders or involved in (illegal) crop mortgage schemes; some were tenants in private pump schemes established in the 1950s to grow cotton along the Blue Nile; and some, of course, were all of the above. Few worked as wage laborers seasonally or otherwise through the first half of the twentieth century. Most households were able to make do with a varying mix of cultivation, animal husbandry, and forestry, and virtually all of the young people coming of age in the village stayed there when they formed households of their own.
The land tenure system, as in much of central Sudan, was a patchwork of small holdings held in common and distributed as needed by the local Shaykh. Most farm households cultivated more than one small plot to mitigate the effects of crop pests, poor rains, drainage problems, and the like. Rain-fed land was cultivated for as long as twenty years before it was left fallow and new land cleared. Young men coming of age were allocated land from family holdings, fallow areas, or common lands. The only constraint on access to cultivable land was distance from the village, and, by the time the system was undone by the coming of a state-sponsored agricultural project, all plots were less than an hour's walk away. Villagers had access to wood and grazing resources in their holdings, in fallowed fields, and in the common land and waste areas around the village. Various accounts of land use in the area just prior to its transformation by the Suki Project in 1970 indicate that wood resources were readily available and grazing lands were adequate to sustain local livestock, though some large holders sent animals to graze during the harsh dry season with nomadic relatives (see MacDonald et al. 1964; al Tayib 1970) .
The Suki Agricultural Project, into which the village was incorporated in 1970, changed all of this. That was precisely its intent. As a development project, the Suki scheme was intended to bolster Sudan's export earnings, to incorporate rural dwellers more firmly into the cash economy as producers and laborers, and to "modernize" the rural sector, among other things. The project, which encompassed 85,000 acres in the vicinity of the village, was predicated on the irrigated cultivation of cotton and groundnuts for the world market, using a crop rotation sequence that precluded the mix of land uses that had sustained people in Howa since its establishment a century before. In clearing and leveling 2,500 acres adjacent to the village for the establishment of 250 farm tenancies for villagers, the Suki Project administration circumscribed the land available for other kinds of cultivation, grazing, and forestry. The altered political ecology that resulted, as much as the production requirements of the project itself, deepened Howa's intersections with the cash economy. In limiting grazing lands and drastically reducing wooded areas, the project gradually led to the commodification of formerly free, shared, or commonly held goods such as wood, meat, and ultimately milk. For people with deep and enduring pastoral roots, the last was anathema.
But that was not all. Tenants were expressly forbidden to cultivate sorghum on project lands. In a stroke, people who had been relatively selfsufficient in food production were prevented from growing their staple crop except on the marginal lands left out of the project. As they became contract farmers, they also became purchasers of sorghum. But there was a twist to this common effect of"development." Since independence, much of the patronage and private development in Sudan had gone into the expansion of mechanized sorghum cultivation by large holders, and this had stepped up in the 1970s. By the end of the first decade of the Suki Project, the price of sorghum soared 2,000 percent, and people's vulnerability was palpable. Gone from the landscape were their old earthen storage pits for sorghum, with surpluses from which they might have benefited given these price increases. Instead they faced increasing food insecurity. At the same time, the first wave of structural adjustments hit Sudan, reducing food subsidies and pushing harder on the government to focus on export crops. Food vulnerability led to anger and resistance, and in 1981 the Suki Tenants Union agitated for and won the right to cultivate sorghum in their tenancies, albeit in their groundnut and not their cotton allocation. In the meantime, as pastures deteriorated, many evaded project authorities and let their animals browse on the cotton crop. While the latter strategy of resistance redirected land and labor value to tenant households and away from national coffers and international ministrations, the former traded potential income for food. The 1970 project was the outcome of and dovetailed with a set of national and international development strategies. Sudan's development has been pegged to cotton export since the establishment of the Gezira Scheme in 1925, which supplied the textile mills of Manchester, England. As the market shifted from Britain to the Soviet Union followed by the United States and elsewhere and the world price fluctuated, Sudan's leaders stuck to cotton above all else, although they also supported irrigation projects for sugar, wheat, and groundnuts and the expansion of the mechanized farm areas of central Sudan for the rain-fed cultivation of sorghum. The Suki Project, which drew on gravity irrigation from the Blue Nile, had been in the works prior to the so-called May Revolution of 1969, when Ja'afar Mohamed al Nimeiri came to power in a military coup, but it was expedited so that his administration could demonstrate its commitment to rural development. In the rush, built-in land use conflicts and shoddy work were ignored, which led to production difficulties, greater socioeconomic differentiation than might have been expected, and serious but avoidable environmental degradation that further propelled commodification of formerly free or commonly held goods such as wood, wild fruit, meat, and milk.
A topography of globalization The effects of capitalism, imperialism, and state power were everywhere manifest in Howa from 1979 when I first visited. They riddled everyday material social practices, and in the last two decades they have rescripted the relationships between local residents and their social networks, altered their sense of their place in the world (and the world in their place), and changed the grounds, literally, of work and play (Katz 1991a (Katz , 1991b (Katz , 1998 At first in Howa, the effects of restructuring were most directly experienced through the Suki Project, a massive state-sponsored and multilaterally funded agricultural development project. Its intent and effect were to transform an area of mixed land use, with minimal cash crop production, into a political ecology geared largely to cash cropping and full incorporation into the national and global economies. Much of the area around the village was cleared and leveled to support the irrigated cultivation of cotton and groundnuts for the world market, while animal husbandry and forestry were relegated to marginal off-project lands. These lands were therefore subjected to a much more intense use than before, straining local political ecologies.
I was particularly interested in what happened to children as subjects and "objects" of social reproduction under these conditions. I wanted to see how these altered political-economic, sociocultural, and political-ecological conditions affected their everyday lives and opportunities, and how in their work, play, and learning children negotiated this shifting terrain to construct themselves as historical subjects and social actors while helping to make a world they might inhabit as adults. I was looking for resistance.
My findings were grim. For instance, because of the nature of cotton and groundnut cultivation in the irrigation project, more, not less, family labor was required after the project than before. Moreover, increased land use intensity around the project led to collateral environmental changes that increased the time required for the more distant procurement of wood and the grazing of animals, both largely children's tasks. The pace of commodification and monetization of the economy had also intensified, in part because goods that were formerly held in common or free, such as wood or milk, were becoming more difficult to procure, and in part because a wealth of products from other parts of Sudan or further afield were being introduced into local markets, and a growing number of residents were seduced by them.
These shifts regrooved the particular gendered and otherwise differentiated relations of production and reproduction in Howa, increasing children's labor time and reducing possibilities for attending school. Certain aspects of land tenure in the Suki Project, for instance, helped increase the valences of patriarchy and the power of Howa's men to mobilize the labor of their children and wives. In particular, by initially allocating tenancies in the project to men, except in rare cases, the project administration relied on and enhanced their ability to conscript family labor when, for (perennial) financial reasons, they were not able to hire external labor. The more distant and more time-consuming acquisition of wood fuels and grazing of animals especially affected children because, growing up in Islamic northern Sudan, where women of prime child-bearing age (roughly between puberty and thirty-five years of age) were discouraged from working outside the hosh or houseyards of their extended families, these tasks fell to children. As a result of this gendered dynamic, environmental degradation had a disproportionate effect on children's lives, narrowing their opportunities to acquire a formal education. For similar reasons, rampant commodification also increased children's work time. Child labor provided vital additional cash for their increasingly strapped households to purchase newly commodified or recently introduced goods. Children also procured certain commodified goods such as wild fruit, water, or wood so that their families could either save the expenditure on them or benefit from their sale to others in the village or further afield.
For children coming of age in Howa, restructuring meant the twin ravages of displacement and de-skilling. As the agricultural project transformed the conditions of production and social reproduction, children found themselves reproducing the familiar constellation of agriculture, animal husbandry, and local forestry use, but it was an increasingly untenable political ecology. The project's land tenure arrangements from the outset I Katz fixed the number of tenancies lower than the number of households in Howa. As the average household included five children and most parents of young adults remained economically active themselves, access to productive land for most young men coming of age was out of the question. Yet few had been able to attend school to prepare for other work possibilities in Howa or in the towns. That the globalizing impetus borne by the Suki Project was the primary source of these shifts was undeniable but is only part of the story. Safety valves that might in other societies have absorbed the increasing economic pressure were largely unavailable here. Deep-seated corruption and patronage systems filtered the development strategies through powerful social hierarchies, stunting the distribution of resources and access to betterpaying nonagricultural jobs. For example, one of the few young men in the village who had earned a secondary school certificate by the 1990s had not been able to find a job after searching in government offices, private companies, and banks in several nearby towns and the capital area. He was forced to return home and take a teaching job in a neighboring village that paid the equivalent of U.S.$22 a month, well below subsistence levels even in the countryside. Bemoaning his situation, which included an indefinitely postponed marriage, he said, "No one wants this job, only if you can't find work outside would you take this. Good jobs are available but I don't have strong connections (wastagowiya); you need recommendations from someone 'from within' . .. if you don't know anybody on the inside, you can't get in" (Abdullah 1995).
For girls matters were at once worse and better than for the boys. Less than 5 percent of the girls in Howa between seven and twelve years of age attended school in the early 1980s. Most were too important to the daily work of reproduction, including gathering wood, fetching water, minding children, and assisting with a range of household chores, to be spared by their families for school, especially in a coeducational setting that was frowned upon by many parents and grandparents. In addition to these tasks, girls also participated in farming until they reached puberty, when their participation began to taper off, depending on family wealth. Unlike boys, girls were not taught the skills required to handle the demands of the agricultural cycle or the overall sequencing of seasonal agricultural tasks. Thus, when some boys began to migrate as they reached adulthood, often leaving their sisters to tend to agricultural production, the girls were ill prepared. Girls were well prepared to continue the work of reproduction within their community, but, because displaced young men now found it more difficult to raise a bride-price and start a household, the age of mar-riage was increasing, leaving young women to work in their family households much longer than had been customary. Unlike in the past, many of those well past puberty continued to work family fields, thus drawing upon widely shared community knowledge that might otherwise have lain dormant.
Nevertheless, one of the most palpable changes I witnessed in the wake of these shifts in the local and broader political economy was a villagewide mobilization on behalf of schooling girls. In less than a generation, village leaders had deployed the resources of a series of self-help initiatives to build and staff a girls' elementary school, and by 1995 the finishing touches on a coeducational secondary school (with separate classes for girls and boys) were being put in place. While the migrations propped up an increasingly untenable local economy, they also altered men's relationships to one another and to their families. Not only did labor migration force postponement of marriage and child rearing, but it exposed migrants to the cultural and political-economic flows of globalization in ways that were unknown previously. Among other things, these practices gave rise to a kind of rural cosmopolitanism that was dramatically new. What was perhaps most interesting, and certainly most politically repercussive, was how these new political-economic relationships did not undermine earlier political ecologies but rather enabled their endurance despite myriad contradictions and difficulties. Exotic consumer products acquired after a stint of working in Saudi Arabia, for instance, were purchased not so much for consumption as for a hedge against debt or calamity. Videocassette recorders (VCRs) were more a means of saving money -much as livestock had been -than machines to play videos. The shift made sense in Howa, which lacked both pastures and electricity.
Time-space expansion embraces, reworks, and plays into the altered geographies of globalization. While people in Howa found it increasingly necessary to expand the space of their economic operations in order to stay afloat and enable the mix of agriculture, animal husbandry, and forestry to endure, the social matrix within which they understood themselves and their economic prospects had changed dramatically within just one generation of the establishment of the project. If in one way the known world The topography here was intended to produce a thick historical geography of Howa, making clear that it is not simply globalization that is important but also its encounter with existing social relations and material social practices in particular places. In Sudan the material social practices associated with globalizing capitalist relations of production and reproduction intersected with volatile political circumstances, disintegrating economic conditions, and a deeply troubled historical geography of racialized religious and ethnic difference to make them all worse. Each of these threads of local globalizations can be seen in the landscape, and doing a topography brings them into sharp relief to expose their tensions, contradictions, and affiliations. In the topography here, for instance, we can see how globalization has provoked, undermined, and reworked the sedimented social relations of production and reproduction in Howa along with many of the cultural forms and practices of everyday life to produce a precarious political ecology for its population. I have traced just three strands of this process, economic restructuring, time-space expansion, and Sudan's civil war, but these and other processes can be followed to other places-within and beyond Sudan's borders-to produce analytic "contour lines" situating distinct locales in relation to particular social practices.
Topography is resolutely material. But there are productive metaphorical entailments of the idea as well, and these are also at the heart of why I have done a topography of globalization in Howa. Topography is associated not just with the description of place but also with measurements of elevation, distance, and other structural attributes that enable the examination of relationships across spaces and between places. The material social practices associated with globalization work in interconnection, such as when capital, labor, or cultural products movefrom one place to another, but they work iteratively as well: the effects of capitalism's globalizing imperative are experienced commonly across very different locales, and understanding these connections is crucial if they are to be challenged effectively. Topog- where, while the latter resulted from the "development" policies pursued by the Sudanese state (in conjunction with international financial institutions) that undermined the traditional means of production and of reproducing local relations in Howa. It seemed to me that in both places, large segments of the generation currently coming of age were being derailed to a marginalized zone in which there were few guarantees for sustained -let alone meaningful -work as adults. In subsequent years, large numbers of this "excessed" population appear to have been "warehoused" as a matter of state policy, as we see in prisons in the United States and in the army or people's militias in the case of Sudan. Nevertheless, in both settings I have I Katz found remarkable resilience at the community level and a tendency for people to organize to rework the conditions confronting them if not actually to resist them outright. I think of the remarkable increase in support for formal education for girls and boys in Howa in just a single generation and compare that with block-by-block efforts by neighborhood residents in New York to reject crack cocaine and hound its purveyors away. The numbers of children in primary school in Howa more than doubled in less than fifteen years, while recent reports in New York indicate equally dramatic reductions in crack use by young people over a similar period. Whereas I originally understood the comparison between the two cases more sequentially as an examination of the kinds of displacements children can suffer in the transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy and from an industrial to a postindustrial economy, the perspective offered by doing a topographical analysis affords a more productive and spatialized understanding of the problems. Not only does this kind of analysis reveal the simultaneity of different kinds of disruptions but, making good on John Berger's brilliant insight that it is now "space not time that hides consequences from us," it also reveals the intertwined consequences of globalizing capitalist production in ways that demand a different kind of politics (1974, 40; see Soja 1989 ). My argument is that if the disruption of social reproduction in Howa and Harlem are two effects of a common set of processes, and I think they are, then any effective politics challenging a capital-inspired globalization must have similar global sensitivities, even as its grounds are necessarily local. This is different from a "place-based" politics. It is not merely about one locale or another, nor is it a matter of just building coalitions between such diverse places, vital as that is. Precisely because globalization is such an abstraction, albeit with varying forms, struggles against global capital have to mobilize equivalent, alternative abstractions. Built on the critical triangulation of local topographies, countertopographies provide exactly these kinds of abstractions interwoven with local specificities and the impulse for insurgent change.
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